

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-13 L-03
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 11202

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC, TECH, IN
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

REF: BOMBAY 1819

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AMCONSUL BOMBAY JULY 21ST
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOMBAY 1819

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC, TECH, IN
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

1. AT SETHNA'S INVITATION I CALLED ON HIM JULY 19
TO FOLLOW UP ON A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING NUCLEAR ISSUES,
PARTICULARLY SOME DISCUSSED AT INDIAN IAEC MEETING IN NEW
DELHI ON JULY 12.

2. HE SAID THAT IAEC IS STILL WORKING UP A RESPONSE
TO SENATOR SPARKMAN'S SUGGESTION THAT AN AMOUNT OF
HEAVY WATER EQUIVALENT TO THE AMOUNT SUPPLIED BY U.S.
BE PLACED IN SAFEGUARDED FACILITY. ALL HIS
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COLLEAGUES AGREE THAT THE AMOUNT SUPPLIED BY U.S. FOR
INITIAL SUPPLY FOR CIRUS SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED.
HE SAID, IN FACT, THAT SUCH AN AMOUNT HAS ALREADY BEEN MOVED
TO RAPP. HE IMPLIED THAT THERE SOME PROBLEM WITH FORMALLY
CONFIRMING THIS ACTION, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. I DID
NOT ASK ABOUT SAFEGUARDING AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO OUR

CONTRIBUTION THE INITIAL CHARGE FOR RAPP I AS I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT SENATOR SPARKMAN'S SUGGESTION EXTENDS THIS FAR AS OUR SUPPLY FOR RAPP I WAS CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE CANADIANS TO MAKE GOOD THEIR COMMITMENT TO SUPPLY THAT REACTOR.

3. SETHNA CONFIRMED HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS THAT INDIA COULD NOT AGREE TO A FIVE YEAR OR ANY OTHER LIMITED PERIOD FOR FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AS SUGGESTED IN NEW YORK TALKS. ONCE FACILITIES ARE PUT UNDER SAFEGUARDS GOI EXPECTS THEM TO STAY THERE.

4. I ASKED SETHNA WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN A PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING SUGGESTION FOR CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF SAFEGUARDS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. SETHNA SAID THAT THIS SUGGESTION HAD BEEN ADVANCED BY SHANKER IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON WITHOUT ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH HIM AND HE THOUGHT IT WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. NEW DELHI HAD ASKED HIM TO GIVE SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF SUCH AN ACTIVITY AND TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERTS. HE SAID HIS FIRST EFFORTS TO RESPOND HAD NOT BEEN PRODUCTIVE AS ALL HIS SUGGESTIONS SEEM TO IMPLY DUPLICATION OF WORK ALREADY BEING DONE IN INFCE AND IAEA. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IN FINAL ANALYSIS MEA AND PM'S OFFICE WOULD HAVE TO SPELL IT OUT BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL INITIATIVE. HE UNDERSTANDS ITS PURPOSE IS TO DETERMINE "MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED TO DETECT WHEN A PARTICIPATING

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COUNTRY MIGHT BE UNDERTAKING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM". FOR EXAMPLE HE SAID THA SAFEGUARDS CLEARLY WOULD BE REQUIRED ON A REPROCESSING FACILITY BYT THEY MIGHT HAVE TO APPLY ONLY TO URANIMUM WITH LESS THAN 20 PERCENT ENRICHMENT. LOW ENRICHED URANIUM COULD NOT BE USED IN ANY EFFECTIVE WEAPON EVEN THOUGH ONE WOULD NOT WANT TERRORISTS TO HAVE ACCESS TO ANY FISSILE MATERIAL BUT THAT LATTER QUESTION IS ONE OF PUBLIC SAFETY RATHER THAN PROLIFERATION.

5. REPROCESSING. I NOTED THAT THERE CONTINUES TO BE MISUNDERSTANDING OVER HIS POSITION ON THE REPROCESSING OF TARAPUR FUEL AS I HAD HEARD TI ALLEGED THAT HE CONSIDERED REPROCESSING ALL TOGETHER AS NOBODY SEEMED TO REPORT HIS VIEWS CORRECTLY. HE CONTINUED THAT WHEN CONSIDERING REPORCESSING OF TARAPUR FUEL ONE ALWAYS HAD TO KEEP IN MIND THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. BILATERAL AND HIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OF DIXIE LEE RAY. ALL OF HIS REMARKS ABOUT REPROCESSING OF TARAPUR FUEL WERE DIRECTED TO USE OF FUEL IN THAT FACILITY. IN THE PAST HE HAD DISCUSSED REPROCESSING WITH RELATION TO A) INSUFFICIENT STORAGE CAPACITY B) THE NEED TO RECYCLE FUEL AT TARAPUR AND C) THE NEED TO RETURN THE CONTAINED URANIUM TO THE U.S. TO RECEIVE CREDIT FOR

FURTHER SHIPMENTS OF FRESH UF6. HE SAID THAT SINCE SO MUCH TIME AND EFFORT HAVE BEEN DEVOTED TO THE RERACKING SUTY IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SPENT FUEL STORAGE PROBLEM CAN BE OVERCOME WITHOUT RESORT TO REPROCESSING. IF THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SUPPLY FRESH UF6 THERE WILL BE NO NEED TO RECYCLE URANIUM AND/OR PLUTONIUM AT TARAPUR. HE HAD BEEN ASKED AT SOME RECENT JUNCTURE HOW MUCH CREDIT INDIA WOULD GET AGAINST FRESH UF 6 THROUGH A RETURN OF CONTAINED URANIUM IN THE SPENT FUEL. HE HAD GIVEN AN ESTIMATE RELATING TO VARIOUS ACCUMMULATIONS AND RECALLED ON OF THEM HAD TO DO WITH 1981. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE REPROCESSING OF TARAPUR FUEL NEED NOT BE A PROBLEM AS LONG AS BOTH PARTIES TO THE BILATERALS MAINTAIN OBLIGATIONS UNDER THAT AGREEMENT.

6. A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE COST OF RERACKING TARAPUR POOLS
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WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY. COURTNEY UNQUOTE
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